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By CRAIG A. STERN *
The king must not be under man but under God and under the
law, because law makes the king.1
WHATEVER IT MAY mean,2 the rule of law commands apparently
universal respect-or at least receives apparently universal lip-ser-
vice-among civil governments. 3 Classically, the rule of law has been
counterpoised to the rule of man, a rule held to be much inferior.
Man is willful, apt to help friends and to harm foes even when obliged
to judge fairly. Accordingly, the standard law dictionary gives these
two pertinent definitions of "rule of law": "2. The supremacy of regu-
lar as opposed to arbitrary power .... -Also termed supremacy of law.
3. The doctrine that every person is subject to the ordinary law within
the jurisdiction .... -"4 The rule of law is government according to
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1. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (photo. reprint 1997)
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (circa 1250) (footnote omitted). "Ipse
autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lexfacit regem" (original Latin of
cited quote). 2 id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
2. SeeJudith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL
OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (arguing that "[i]t
would not be very difficult to show that the phrase 'the Rule of Law' has become meaning-
less thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use .... The upshot is that the Rule of
Law is now situated, intellectually, in a political vacuum.").
3. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule ofLawforEveryone, Social Science Research Network
Electronic Library at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID312622code0205
17140.pdfPabstractid=312622 (last accessed Apr. 18, 2004). Even Marxist rulers, if not
Marxist academics, have endorsed the rule of law. Id. at 4; see a/soJohn N. Paden, The World
Trade Organization and the Rule of Law in China: A First-Year Assessment, VA. LAw., Apr. 2003,
at 20, 21.
4. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1332 (7th ed. 1999).
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rules. 5 It requires that those who govern not only govern by law, but
also see to it that they themselves are governed by law.
Necessarily, the idea that the rule of law is preferable to the rule
of man is one founded upon presuppositions regarding civil justice,
authority, man, and what is good. Ultimately, the system of such
presuppositions is a religious system. Delve deeply enough, and the
ideal of the rule of law rests upon the most fundamental beliefs.
6 It
rests upon fundamental beliefs as a concept and it rests upon funda-
mental beliefs as a practice. This paper attempts to limn the religious
foundations of the rule of law, and especially the rule of law embraced
within the common law,7 the basic Anglo-American jurisprudence.8 It
also notes how a departure from even subconsciously followed relig-
ious foundations yields a change in the rule of law, marking that
change in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey-specifically, that Court's treatment of stare deci-
sis. Part I of this Article will briefly note some important religious un-
derpinnings of different legal systems in order to demonstrate the
inherent connection between religion and the rule of law. Part II will
explore the influence of Christianity on Anglo-American common law
regarding the fundamental tenets underlying the rule of law. Then, in
Part III, this Article will highlight Planned Parenthood v. Casey as a semi-
nal case marking the judiciary's increasing willingness to depart from
foundations-rooted in the Christianity undergirding the common
law-that previously characterized the use of stare decisis. Part IV con-
5. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1179-80 (1989). But see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 60 (1991) ("The rule of law is not
quite a law of rules [citing the foregoing), but it is a law of rules, principles, customs,
practices, and understandings.").
6. See generally David Novak, Law: Religious or Secular?, 86 VA. L. REv. 569 (2000) (ar-
guing that law is rooted in religion).
7. "Common law," for purposes of this article, refers to what Black's Law Dictionary
defines as "the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government and
security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of
immemorial antiquity .... The common law is all the statutory and case law background of
England and the American colonies before the American revolution." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotes and references omitted) (emphasis added).
8. [R]eligion has inserted itself as an influential force in the determination of
the legal order. In the Anglo-American world religion has functioned as one of
the most concrete and specific sources of the moral Weltanschauung. As the
moral ethos has served as the substratum for the legal order, religion has been
one of the main foundations for both the belief and normative systems of the
past.
Raymond G. Decker, Religion and Law in the United States: A Prognosis, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 357,
360 (1979).
9. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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cludes that this departure from traditional foundations will result in a
lawlessness that bodes ill.
I. Non-Christian Religious Roots of the Rule of Law
Before exploring the relation between the Christian religion and
the rule of law in Anglo-American common law, it may be helpful to
note the relation between non-Christian religions and the rule of law
in order to illustrate the impact that religion has on the idea of the
rule of law.
A. Aristotelianism
Aristotle may have been the first to identify and endorse the rule
of law. For example:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal
rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of per-
sons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is
unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all con-
tingencies, to make an exact pronouncement.10
Aristotle further expressed the necessity that law rule: the rule of law
embraces "two senses"-"one which means obedience to such laws as
have been enacted, and another which means that the laws obeyed
have also been well enacted '" In its richest meaning, then, the rule
of law entails the rule of God himself:
He who commands that law should rule may thus be regarded as
commanding that God and reason alone should rule; he who com-
mands that a man should rule adds the character of the beast. Ap-
petite has that character; and high spirit, too, perverts the holders
of office, even when they are the best of men. Law [as the pure
voice of God and reason] may thus be defined as "Reason free
from all passion."1 2
Consequently, as much as possible, rule is to be exercised by divine
reason, not by man so apt to depart from reason.1 3 Though not part
10. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 127 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1971-72) (1946) (III, xi, § 19; 1282b) (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 175 (IV, viii, § 5; 1294a).
12. Id. at 146 (III, xvi, § 5; 1287a) (footnotes omitted) (bracketed words supplied by
translator).
13. These principles also find expression in the Nicomachean Ethics. Equity is needed
to supply gaps found in law by virtue of its generality. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NicoMAcHEA
(W.D. Ross trans.) in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1019-20 (Richard McKeon ed., Ran-
dom House 1941) (V, 10; 1137a-1138a). And yet, "we do not allow a man to rule, but
rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interest and becomes a tyrant. The
magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice, and, if ofjustice, then of equality
also." Id. at 1013 (V, 6; 1134a-b).
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of a genuine theistic system, these propositions rest upon a religious
base, in the broad sense. "One of the most conspicuous features of
Aristotle's view of the universe is his thorough-going teleology."1 4 Ac-
cording to Aristotle, it is God that orders the world, inspiring motion
by love. 15 Man's passion draws him away from this order. The rule of
law, in the fullest sense, secures a rule according to rational God and
not according to passionate and imperfect men.
B. Judaism
To remove from Athens to Jerusalem, it is perhaps tautological to
assert that the foundations for the rule of law in Judaism are religious.
The Torah commands that judges judge according to God's law, who
himself gives judgment through them.16 According to Judaism, man,
the bearer of God's image, is not only by virtue of that image to be
judged according to law, equal before the law, and by lawful process,
but also, by virtue of that image, equipped to judge in such a fash-
ion.1 7 The Hebrew Bible teaches that even God himself submits to his
own law, and is faithful to his covenants, acting according to his own
law when dealing with men.18
14. DAVID Ross, ARISTOTLE 185 (1964).
15. Id. at 181, 185.
16. See Deuteronomy 1:16-17.
17. See, e.g., Genesis 9:5-6.
18. See, e.g., Psalm 105:8 ("He hath remembered his covenant for ever, the word which
he commanded to a thousand generations."). One might think that the divine nature of
Jewish law would lead to a regime of divinely inspired judges, prophets led supernaturally
to resolve legal questions. Such a regime might be called a rule of God in some ways to be
contrasted with a rule of law. Jewish law has firmly resisted such a direction. Perhaps the
most famous passage from the Talmud on this point is the case of the Oven of Akhnai.
Rabbis were disputing a question of the ritual purity of an oven. After Rabbi Eliezer b.
Hyrcanus failed to convince the others by argument, he adduced proof from a tree that
moved itself, a stream that reversed its flow, and walls of the study hall that began to fall, all
in response to the rabbi's calling upon them to attest to the soundness of his position. The
other rabbis insisted that such proofs were illegitimate. So at last Rabbi Eliezer called upon
God himself:
"Again he said to them: 'If the Halakhah is in accord with me, let it be
proved from Heaven.' Whereupon, a heavenly voice cried out: 'Why do you dis-
pute with R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the Halakhah is in accord with
him?' R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: 'It is not in heaven' [Deuteronomy 30:12].
What did he mean by this? R. Jeremiah said: 'The Torah has already been given at
Mt. Sinai. We pay no attention to a heavenly voice because You [God] have al-
ready written in the Torah at Mt. Sinai, "Follow the majority"' [Exodus 23:2].
The story reaches its climax with this conclusion:
"R. Nathan met Elijah [the prophet] and asked him: 'What did the Holy




This teaching of the Hebrew Bible appears to differ from the
teaching of Islam, though a look at Islam also demonstrates the relig-
ious nature of the rule of law. "Islam denies the idea of the law of
nature, and denies that man is made in the image of God, both to
protect the Quran's notion of transcendence (tanzih), as opposed to
the Bible's view of God's covenantal transcendence and imma-
nence."' 9 According to the Quran, "God Himself is withdrawn in
tanzih, or transcendence." 20 "He remains above."' 2 1 The Bible, how-
ever, holds that God, though above his creation, is present to his peo-
ple and has entered into a personal relationship with them by
covenant. 22 The Bible also teaches that God and man are alike
enough that they may share a personal relationship. Furthermore, the
Quran elevates God's will above his character. Divine attributes
are to be understood finally as characteristics of the Divine will
rather than laws of His nature .... What gives unity to all God's
dealings is that He wills them all. He as Willer may be recognized
from time to time by means of the descriptions given. But He does
not essentially conform to any. The action of His will may be identi-
fied in this or that quality: His will of itself is inscrutable. One may
not, therefore, say that God is necessarily loving, holy, righteous,
clement, or relenting, in every and all relations. 23
If Allah may decree as he wills,24 what failure is it for a human ruler
not to do likewise? 25
R. Joshua]? ['] Elijah replied: 'He smiled, saying "My children have bested me, my
children have bested me."'"
MENACHEM ELON ET AL.,JEWISH LAw (MISHPAT IVRi): CAsEs AND MATERIALS 18 (1999) (quot-
ing from Bava Mezi'a 59b of the Babylonian Talmud (bracketed material in source)); see
also Elliot Dorff, Judaism as a Religious Legal System, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1331, 1338 (1978)
("The Rabbis explicitly claimed that human judges in each generation have the authority
to make decisions in Jewish law and that God no longer has the right or authority to do
so"). The law, once given, is itself the rule. Human judges are to interpret the law as best
they may without the aid of additional special revelation. The rule of law trumps the direct
rule of God the lawgiver himself. Id.
19. Joseph N. Kickasola, Islam and "The Rule of Law" (Mar. 2003) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the author).
20. Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret 48 (1964).
21. Id.
22. See Badru D. Kateregga & David W. Shenk, A Muslim and a Christian in Dialogue
115-21 (1997).
23. CRAGG3, supra note 20, at 42.
24. See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 149-50 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000)
(1984).
25. To be sure, Islam has its holy law of the Koran, the Shari'a. But the Shari'a is for
Muslims alone. See Roger Scruton, The Political Problems ofIslam, INTERCOLLEGIATE REV., Fall
Spring 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
H. Christianity and the Rule of Law in the Common Law
The rule of law, then, has religious roots. One would expect,
therefore, that the flourishing of the rule of law in the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition has something to do with Christianity, the dominant re-
ligion of the culture that developed the common law. 26 In the sense
important to our discussion at least, Christianity is a part of the com-
mon law.27 The common law is the fundamental law of the Anglo-
American legal system. It has been developed by judges since the mid-
dle ages, and continues to be developed by judges today. It is the law
that other elements in our legal system presuppose.
Whether Christianity is a part of this common law was the subject
of a famous dispute between Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Story, illus-
trious student and teacher of the law, and Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.28 Jefferson traced a precedent declar-
ing Christianity to be a part of the common law to rest ultimately on a
mistranslation of a phrase of old law French. Story argued that the
common law had ever recognized Christianity as true, and had framed
certain legal doctrines accordingly. 29 But, beyond the level at which
2002, at 3, 10. And even for Muslims, the Shari'a does not support a full-blown legal order
for a polity:
The writ of holy law runs through all things, but this does not mean that
Islamic societies have been governed solely by the shari'a. On the contrary, in
almost all respects relevant to the government of a large society, the shari'a is
radically deficient. It has therefore been necessary in every epoch for the ruler to
lay down laws of his own which will guarantee his power, facilitate administration,
and permit the collection of taxes. But these laws have no independent legitimacy
in the eyes of those compelled to obey them. They do not create a space outside
religion in which freedom is the norm. On the contrary, they merely add to the
constraints of the holy law the rules of a political order which is backed by no de
jure authority, only by de facto power. In any upheaval they are rejected entirely as
the arbitrary edicts of a usurper. Hence, there is no scope in a traditional Islamic
society for the kinds of purely political development, through the patient build-
ing of institutions and secular laws, that we know in the West. Change, when it
comes, takes the form of a crisis, as power is challenged from below in the name
of the one true Power above.
If the only way in which a law can be legitimated is by deriving it from a
command of God, then clearly all secular laws are seen as mere expedients
adopted by the ruler. In such circumstances it is unlikely that any kind of constitu-
tional, representative, or democratic government will emerge.
Id. at 10. Laws are "the arbitrary edicts of a usurper," not the stuff to support a rule of law.
26. See Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order 173-75 (1974).
27. See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 118-40
(1971) (discussing, in light of the famous debate between Jefferson and Story, in what





Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Story argued the question, the religious ideas of
the men that developed the common law-many of whom were pre-
lates or at least clerics 30 -necessarily affected their work. These relig-
ious ideas-like all ideas-have consequences. That these ideas were
specifically Christian made their consequences upon the law all the
more necessary, as shall appear.
To draw the connections between the Christian faith and the rule
of law cultivated in the common law tradition is not to suggest that the
Christian faith is the only possible basis for the rule of law. At least one
very obvious fact precludes such a suggestion: the Christian faith de-
pends upon Jewish revelation. Nor is it to deny the influence of no-
tions from outside Christianity. Perhaps the present discussion is best
seen as an attempt to show that the Christian religion provides an
especially rich soil for the growth of the rule of law, and that the flour-
ishing of the rule of law in the common law tradition owes much to
the Christian faith.31
Four Christian ideas-doctrines, in fact-are both especially im-
portant to that religion and especially important to the rule of law in
the common law tradition. The first of these is the doctrine of God
himself, that is, his being and his work. Second is the doctrine of man,
made in God's image. Third is the fall of man; fourth is the atone-
ment of man. These doctrines are at the base of Christianity. 32 They
also happen to provide a base upon which the Anglo-American legal
system could build a strong commitment to the rule of law. This sec-
tion will explain the Christian doctrines and then show how different
aspects of common law reflect and build upon these doctrines.
A. The Doctrine of God
1. The Being and Authority of God
The Christian faith holds that God is the "I AM," the uncreated
creator of all that is, who is from everlasting to everlasting. 33 He is also
30. See RICHARD O'SULLIVAN, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE COMMON LAw 10-12
(1947).
31. Cf Jeffrey Brauch & Robert Woods, Faith, Learning and Justice in Alan Dershowitz's
The Genesis of Justice: Toward a Proper Understanding of the Relationship Between the Bible and
Modern Justice, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 50-60 (2001) (demonstrating that "within [the] frame-
work [of biblically based higher law] ... the common law developed a deep commitment
to the rule of law." Id. at 50).
32. Besides being some of the chief teachings of the Bible, these doctrines are at least
implicit in the creeds accepted by Christians from the earliest times to the present. See
GERALD BRAY, CREEDS, COUNCILS AND CHRIST (1984).
33. See Exodus 3:13-14 ("And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the
children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you;
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the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, a God of relationship, of cove-
nant. 4 In this way, he is both transcendent and immanent. According
to the New Testament, he is love. 35 His love is expressed, in part, in
providing law for all his creation, understood both as rules describing
what is, and as rules prescribing what ought to be. His law comes from
his will, but his will expresses his eternal, unchanging nature. "The
being of God is a kind of law to his working .... ,,36As Sir William
Blackstone puts it, God is wise, and so his law is perfectly suited to his
creation.3 7 God also keeps the covenants and the laws he makes. David
declares of him, "thou hast magnified thy word above all thy name."
38
Within the Christian tradition, God holds all authority,39 but au-
thorizes others to exercise portions of that authority as his ministers.
40
Exercising authority for God does not make one a god. Caesar and
God are distinct: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to
God the things that are God's." 4 1 And yet Caesar is appointed by God
to administer a share of God's justice.4 2 According to the Christian
and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto
Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM
hath sent me unto you."); John 8:56-59 ('Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day: and
he saw it, and was glad. Then said the Jews unto him, Thou art not yet fifty years old, and
hast thou seen Abraham? Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abra-
ham was, I am. Then took they up stones to cast at him: butJesus hid himself, and went out
of the temple, going through the midst of them, and so passed by.") (italics in the Author-
ized Version of the Bible signify words with no verbal equivalent in the original text).
34. See Exodus 3:14-15 ("And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said,
Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you. And God said
moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, the LORD God of
your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me
unto you: this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations."); Matthew
22:31-32 ("But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was
spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the
God ofJacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."); Mark 12:26-27 (parallel
passage); Luke 20:37-38 (parallel passage).
35. See 1 John 4:8, 16.
36. 1 RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAws OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 150 (J.M. Dent & Sons
1925) (1594).
37. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *40.
38. Psalm 138:2.
39. See, e.g., Matthew 28:18.
40. See Romans 13:1-6.
41. Mark 12:17. When asked by those trying to trap him whether Jews should pay
tribute to Caesar, Jesus asked whose image was on the tribute money and, being told it was
Caesar's, spoke this famous aphorism. Id.
42. Romans 13:1-6:
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of
God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the
power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to them-
selves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt
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understanding, civil government is not divine; rather it is invested, like
any human authority, with a limited commission from God. As such,
civil government is under God and his law, and obliged to reflect
God's justice.43
The history of Anglo-American common law demonstrates a
profound commitment to these truths. The common law proper oper-
ated among a diversity of authorities, civil and ecclesiastic. 44 Its range
was limited. For example, actions in the common law court began
with a royal document called "the original writ... the source of the
jurisdiction of the court: ' '45
The Court of Common Pleas was historically, and in legal theory, a
court of delegates whose authority was not general, but derived
from an ad hoc commission separately given for every individual
case. Hence the court had no powers beyond those conferred by
the original writ and could not go beyond the four corners of that
document.46
The king's writs, issued to bring cases before the English common law
courts, applied only to specific cases; they supported no broad asser-
tion of authority by the courts. And so "the rule of writs is the rule of
law."47 Authority of the common law courts was limited by law.
The common law was but one of several competing legal sys-
tems. 48 Professor Harold Berman largely ascribes the rise of the rule
of law in the West to the diversity of legal authorities. 49 This very diver-
thou then not be afraid of the power? do [sic] that which is good, and thou shalt
have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if
thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is
the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Where-
fore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For
for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continu-
ally upon this very thing.
43. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAw 123-24 (Marguerite
Wieser trans., The Seabury Press 1969) (1946): "The scriptures clearly teach the subordina-
tion of the state to law. The state is created for the benefit of law.... [L]aw gives a reason for
being and a purpose to the state. The latter is the servant, not the master, of law."
44. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *63 ("The lex non scripta, or unwritten law,
includes not only general customs, or the common law properly so called; but also the partic-
ular customs of certain parts of the kingdom; and likewise those particular laws, that are by
custom observed only in certain courts and jurisdictions.").
45. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 408 (5th ed.
1956).
46. Id.
47. HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 458 (1983).
48. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 45, at 207-14; see also BERMAN, supra note 47, at 39
("Blackstone's concept of two centuries ago that we live under a considerable number of
different legal systems has hardly any counterpart in contemporary legal thought.").
49. See BERMAN, supra note 47, at 10, 215, 292, 294, 536-37.
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sity of legal authorities required rules limiting their respective opera-
tions. And beneath this diversity-perhaps most clearly in the diversity
that embraced church as well as kingdom 50-lay the belief that ulti-
mate authority rests with God, who has apportioned the ministerial
exercise of authority to diverse human instruments.
A famous monument to this diversity of authority is the Magna
Carta. There, King John pledged, 'In the first place, we have granted
to God, and by this our present charter confirmed, for us and for our
heirs forever, that the English church shall be free, and shall hold its
rights entire and its liberties uninjured .. ".51 Certainly, this pledge
would have been idle had not the king been thought to have been
bound to his words. Under God, and before God, a king must keep
his pledge, like God himself who keeps his own pledge. 52 Architect of
the Magna Carta, Archbishop Stephen Langton of Canterbury,
manifests in the charter not only his mastery of canon law, but also the
familiarity with Holy Scriptures to be expected from the man who is
credited with articulating the Bible into the chapter divisions we use
to this day.
Thus, the Magna Carta stands for a kingship limited in its author-
ity by law. The king is not God, but under God and God's law, and so
obliged to keep his word. The king is limited in his power over the
church. He exercises only a partial government. Beyond these things,
however, the Magna Carta commits the crown to proceeding accord-
ing to law: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed,
or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon
him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land."53 If God himself is just and adheres to the law,
so must his minister proceed according to the law. 54 And proceeding
50. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
67-85 (2001) (discussing and presenting materials on this diversity in England).
51. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 1, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 11 (Richard L. Perry &
John C. Cooper eds., 1978).
52. That Pope Innocent III declared the first Magna Carta of 1215 void for having
been exacted without his consent only emphasizes that such a pledge, properly executed,
was binding and not just a concession to superior power. The charter enjoyed repeated
reissues later that did validly bind sovereigns. See id. at 4. "[E]ventually it was confirmed at
least thirty times before the close of the Middle Ages." ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE
COMMON LAW 54 (Liberty Press 1985) (1966).
53. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 51, at 17
(footnote omitted).
54. The great importance of Magna Carta was that it introduced a... theory of
law, under which the king could be legally bound. It is most unlikely that any of
those who attached their seals to the Great Charter realized this, but it is implicit
in chapter 39. They did not, of course, reject the idea that the king was bound by
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according to law entails designating arbiters of judgment-courts-as
separate from organs exercising will or force.55
2. God the Lawgiver
The method of the common law itself manifests this rule of law
notion that civil government should pursue judgment and not simply
will or force. Consider the development of law by judges in deciding
the cases before them. Common law judges were sworn to decide
cases according to the law. 56 They were directed not to innovate or to
create law.57 They held no legislative power. Rather, judges were to
declare and apply what was already law before that declaration. Law
ruled, and judges were but its oracles. 58
This rule of law in the courts of the common law reflected the
Christian doctrine of God in at least two distinct ways. First, civil jus-
tice mirrored God's justice in its commitment to law. The law estab-
lished the standard, the breach of which supported a claim for
redress. In turn, any redress was duly governed by law in its process
and remedy. Justice was a matter of judgment in applying and vindi-
cating the law. But, second, this method proceeded on the assump-
tion that law existed before courts had occasion to declare and apply
it. If judges were to discover the law and not make it, it must have
been there to discover. To some degree, common law is the custom of
the land-conventions from time immemorial. But to a great degree,
common law is the law of nature, the law prescribed-as Christianity
holds-by God himself for his creation.59
divine law and by the law of nature, but to this they added the third concept, "the
law of the land." This is not law which anyone has commanded. It consists of
those rules which are recognized as being obligatory because they have been de-
veloped through the common custom of the realm. This law of the land is bind-
ing on the king as well as on his subjects.
ARTHUR L. GOODHART, LAW OF THE LAND 27 (1966).
55. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001) (stating that the judiciary "may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment"); see also id. No. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (stating
that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands . .. may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
56. See infra text accompanying note 65.
57. See id.
58. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *69; BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE
GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-650, at 30 (noting that Roman and canon
lawyers at the turn of the thirteenth century could distinguish making law from finding
law).
59. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *39-40:
[A]s man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that
he should in all points conform to his maker's will. This will of his maker is called
Spring 2004] RULE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
As Blackstone explains, in the legal treatise standard in America
at the Founding: 60
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by
God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is
binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them
as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately
or immediately, from this original.
6 1
Men know the law of nature by reason and, more perfectly, by consult-
ing divine law "to be found," Blackstone declared, "only in the holy
scriptures." 62 Municipal law, such as the common law of England, "is
properly defined to be 'a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the su-
preme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting
what is wrong.'- 6 3 Except where it reflects custom on matters indiffer-
ent, the common law reflects true right and true wrong, the law of
nature.
64
It follows then, if a supposed rule of the common law derogated
from the law of nature, it in fact was not law at all. Blackstone wrote of
adherence to pre-existent law by courts:
[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of
justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a
principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that
motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct him-
self in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature,
whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him
also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Cf JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAw AND LIBERAL THEORY 19 (1992) (stating that com-
mon law authority Sir Edward Coke "apparently takes it for granted that divine authority
lies behind the law").
60. In political writings of the Founders, the number of citations to Blackstone was
exceeded only by the number of citations to the Bible and to Montesquieu. See JOHN WITTE
JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 7 (2000).
61. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *41.
62. 1 id at *42.
63. 1 id. at *44.
64. See, e.g., 1 id at *42:
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation [this
second being "the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself," I
id.], depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to
contradict these. There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in
which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but
which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within cer-
tain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy:
for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declar-
atory of, and act in subordination to, the former.
[Vol. 38
RULE OF LAW
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly
declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to
his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one.65
But a pre-existent judicial statement of the law might be erroneous,
might not state accurately what is truly pre-existent law. Consequently,
the rule of adherence to precedent "admits of exception, where the
former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much
more, if it be clearly contrary to the divine law."6 6 Though some may
interpret this exception to allow for judges to create new law where
they determine that a previous understanding of law was incorrect,
Blackstone expressly dismisses this possibility. Instead, he wrote:
But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to
make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresenta-
tion. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly ab-
surd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law,
but that it was not law, that is, that it is not the established custom
of the realm, as has been erroneously determined. 67
The English common law presupposed a just rule extant when the
case arose and when the case was to be decided. 68 Customs, sifted and
supplemented by God's own law of nature-revealed in the Bible and
in reason-provided law for the courts to apply. Such a law of nature
requires a legislator, and the Christian God-creator, lawgiver, and
author of revelation-has supplied this necessary element to the com-
mon law.69
65. 1 id. at *69.
66. 1 id.
67. 1 id. at *70.
68. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472-79 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining the common law doctrine that judges discover, not make, law); see also BRUNO
LEoNI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 85-86 (3d ed. 1991):
According to the English principle of the rule of law, which is closely connected
with the whole history of the common law, rules were not properly the result of
the exercise of the arbitrary will of particular men. They are the object of a dispas-
sionate investigation on the part of courts of judicature .... [T]he attitude of
common-lawjudges towards the rationes decidendi of their cases ... has always been
much less that of a legislator than that of a scholar trying to ascertain things
rather than to change them.
69. Contrast with this view the equally religious view that rejects a transcendent legal
order:
Law, says the new school, has no demonstrable existence outside the facts of life.
The conception of "law" as a body of determinate rules enjoying some kind of
metaphysical existence, and having a definite content which only awaits discovery
Spring 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
3. God the Judge
Yet another aspect of the Christian doctrine of God supported
the rule of law. God is the judge of all mankind. 70 He holds men to his
law, and to their oaths. 71 When kings swore to uphold the law, and
when judges swore to decide cases according to the law, they under-
stood that God would vindicate his law, and would require them to
keep their solemn word. This understanding cautioned those adminis-
tering the law to submit to law, whatever opportunity they might have
had to evade the penalties of merely human justice. 72
B. The Doctrine of Man
The Christian doctrine of God is most fundamental to the rule of
law in the common. law tradition. But a chief link between the doc-
trine of God and the rule of law is the doctrine of man that holds him
to be created in God's image:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the
fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over
every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created
man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male
and female created he them.73
Because man is made in God's image, he can enjoy a relationship with
God that may encompass covenant;74 that may entail the human ad-
by technical reason, is a mere chimera. There certainly are rules of law, in the
sense that people print them and pronounce them, and try to follow them as best
they can be understood, but there is no warrant whatever for supposing they "ex-
ist" in any other sense than these. "Law" is a shorthand term for certain things
that are done and said and written by human beings. If a question of law is
"doubtful," that can only mean that, in point of fact, the people who have looked
into the relevant data and argued it over do not agree on an answer, and this in
turn means that there is no determinate and single correct answer, for there is no
standard, outside the admittedly variant beliefs of the relevant people, to which
one may look.
CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 161-62 (1960).
70. See Genesis 18:25; Acts 10:42.
71. See Revelation 21:8, 27.
72. See ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE CHURCH SHALL BE FREE 5-7 (1965) (describing
the fear of God and the piety of such monarchs as John, William the Conqueror, and
Henry II); see also BERMAN, supra note 47, at 479 (arguing that royal justice was more objec-
tive than that available elsewhere, in part because royal judges "owed an allegiance to the
law, and to God, which was considered to be even higher than their allegiance to the king,"
the former allegiance to be honored at the peril of their souls).
73. Genesis 1:26-27.
74. See, e.g., Genesis 15. "With respect to covenants between God and man in Scripture,
we may give the following definition: A covenant is an unchangeable, divinely imposed legal
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ministration of God's authority and justice;7 5 that may require the ex-
ercise of judgment, applying God's law, or any law at all for that
matter.7 6 Furthermore, because he is made in God's image, man may
enjoy relationships with fellow man in enjoying these privileges and
exercising these faculties. 77 The support given the rule of law by the
Christian doctrine of God would be incomplete without the Christian
doctrine of man.
1. The Idea of Due Process
Beyond this aspect of man made in God's image and so enabled
to act for and with God, lies the aspect of man made in God's image
and therefore worthy of the respect due such a creature. That is, as a
subject of the law, man's bearing God's image requires that he be
given the benefit of the rule of law. 78 From the very first biblical ac-
count of judgment,79 the rabbis derived the principle of due process,
the principle that men deserve notice of charges of wrongdoing and
the opportunity to answer them before their judge.80 Directly after the
sin of Adam and Eve, God, though omniscient, asks Adam, "Hast thou
eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not
eat?""' After listening to Adam's answer, he asks Eve, "What is this that
thou hast done?"8 2 After listening to Eve's answer, but without speak-
ing to the serpent at all, he declares his judgment upon all three of-
agreement between God and man that stipulates the conditions of their relationship." WAYNE
GRUDEM, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 515 (1994).
75. See Romans 13:1-6.
76. See, e.g., Genesis 9:5-6.
77. See, e.g., id. at 2:18-25.
78. Robert P. George, Reason, Freedom, and the Rule of Law: Their Significance in the Natu-
ral Law Tradition, 46 Am. J. Juris. 249, 256 (2001):
Reflection on the relationship of human reason and freedom-and the theologi-
cal significance of this relationship in a tradition crucially shaped by the biblical
account of man as a possessor of spiritual powers and, indeed, as an imago dei-
helps, I believe, to make sense of the centrality of law, and the rule of law, in
Western thought about political morality. In particular, it helps to explain the
stress laid upon the ideal of the rule of law as a fundamental principle of political
justice in the strand of the tradition stretching from early and medieval Christian
thinkers to John Paul II.
79. See Genesis 3. Adam and Even, first man and woman according to the Bible, broke
God's law and confronted God for judgment.
80. See ELON ET AL., supra note 18, at 587; see also R.H. Helmholz, The Development of
Law in Classical and Early Medieval Europe: The Bible in the Service of the Canon Law, 70 CHi.-
KENT L. REv. 1557, 1573-77 (1995) (explaining that canon law found fundamental proce-
dural principles in Genesis 3).
81. Genesis 3:11.
82. Id. at 3:13.
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fenders. Men, unlike the serpentine embodiment of the fallen angel,
and although sinners, receive from God the respect due those made
in his image. God charges, listens, and then judges, according to his
previously declared law. He treats Adam and Eve much as King John
would promise to treat his subjects in the Magna Carta.8 3
2. The Idea of Legal Equality
Human dignity entails being treated according to law. As all
humans equally bear the image of God, so all are to enjoy equality
before the law: "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou
shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of
the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour."84
Adherence to this principle is one of the precepts that A.V. Dicey
marks as components of the common law commitment to the rule of
law:
We mean.., when we speak of the "rule of law" as a characteristic
of our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but
(what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.
In England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection
of all classes to one law administered by the ordinary Courts, has
been pushed to its utmost limit. With us every official, from the
Prime Minister down to the constable or a collector of taxes, is
under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justi-
fication as any other citizen. The Reports abound with cases in
which officials have been brought before the Courts, and made, in
their personal capacity, liable to punishment, or to the payment of
damages, for acts done in their official character but in excess of
their lawful authority.85
Very different from other ancient near eastern legal codes, the Torah
prescribes one law regarding civil matters.8 6 There is no grading of
penalties based upon the status of the wrongdoer or upon the status
83. See supra text accompanying note 53.
84. Leviticus 19:15.
85. A.V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 114
(Liberty Classics 1982) (1885) (footnote omitted). Magna Carta had provided for an equal-
ity of penal fines irrespective of whether the one being fined was a "free man," a
"merchant," or a "villain." MAGNA CARTA, ch. 20, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 51, at 15.
86. Compare HAMMURABI'S LAws 105-07 (M.E.J. Richardson trans., Sheffield Academic
Press 2000) (prescribing compensation and fees for injury and assault, varying with the
status of the victim), with Exodus 21 (prescribing compensation for injury, fundamentally
neutral with respect to the status of the victim).
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of the victim. Instead, there is one law for all. Insofar as all equally
bear God's image, all are to enjoy equality before the law.87
C. The Doctrine of the Fall
just as all men are made in the image of God, so the Christian
faith teaches also that all men are sinners, fallen from their created
state.88 Jesus Christ alone, the "God-Man," is without sin.89 Conse-
quently, no ordinary man exercising a ministry from God exercises it
exactly and without fail as God would have him exercise it. Imperfect
men do not keep covenant, do not judge according to the law, do not
treat other men as equals before the law. However divine their calling,
or perhaps because their calling is divine, they fall short.
The common law acknowledges this third doctrine, the fall of
man, in many of the principles we have already rehearsed. For exam-
ple, recognizing the limits and diversity of human jurisdictions fits
well with recognizing the sinful state of man. Unlimited authority is
not for sinners, but for God alone. The method of the common law,
requiring that judges decide only the cases before them, and that they
give a reasoned opinion in support of that decision, combines episte-
mological modesty with the distrust of judgment without justification.
Another principle directly related to the fall of man is stare deci-
sis, the principle that courts adhere to rules previously announced in
judicial opinions. Chancellor James Kent of New York wrote:
A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case,
becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evi-
dence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and
the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands
unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood
or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made
upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption
is in favor of its correctness; and the community have a right to
regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regu-
late their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be ex-
tremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly
regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability
of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those
who consult them; and people in general can venture with confi-
dence to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. Ifjudicial deci-
sions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle
the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once delib-
erately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless
87. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 31-35.
88. See Psalm 14:1-3; 53:1-3; Romans 3:9-12.
89. See Hebrews 4:15.
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by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except
for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error;
and if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state
of perplexing uncertainty as to the law.
The English courts seem now to consider it to be their duty to ad-
here to the authority of adjudged cases, when they have been so
clearly, and so often, or so long established, as to create a practical
rule of property, notwithstanding they may feel the hardship, or
not perceive the reasonableness of the rule. There is great weight
in the maxim of Lord Bacon, that "optima est lex, quae minimum relin-
quit arbitrio judicis; optimus judex, qui minimum sibi."90
Judges, as they discerned the customs and rules that composed the
common law, had no discretion to alter the law, or even to depart
from precedents unless clearly erroneous. This principle not only sta-
bilized law, as Kent remarks, but also checked indulgence of any judi-
cial impulse to pursue passion rather than law, as Aristotle might say. 9 1
Dean Roscoe Pound attacked such constraints on judicial will as a
product "'of men who believed in original sin,"' and predicted that
"[m]any unhappy results" would follow:
It is hardly too much to say that the ideal judge is conceived of as a
pure machine. Being a human machine and in consequence
tainted with original sin, he must be allowed no scope for free ac-
tion. Hard and fast rules of evidence and strict review of every de-
tail of practice by a series of reviewing tribunals are necessary to
keep him in check. In many states he may not charge the jury in
any effective manner; he must rule upon and submit or reject writ-
ten requests for academically stated propositions of abstract law; he
must not commit any error which might possibly prejudice a
party-whether in fact there is prejudice or not. Dunning has
pointed out that the Puritan in America was able to carry into ef-
fect what in England could only be speculative opinions. Hence in
America, in addition to the ritual ofjustice, belonging to a past age
of formalism that put gold lace and red coats on the skirmish line,
we have a machinery of justice devised to keep down the judicial
personality which has made legal procedure in some sort an end in
itself.92
Though not explicitly attacking stare decisis, Pound exposes the con-
nection between a common law principle that holds judges to deci-
sions previously announced and the Christian teaching that all men
sin; they fall short of their calling.
90. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *475-78 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
Little, Brown 1873) (1826) (footnote omitted). The Latin quoted at the end of this excerpt
translates to, "that law is best which leaves least to the decision of the judge; thatjudge best
who leaves least to himself."
91. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
92. Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 Am. L. REv. 811, 826-27 (1912).
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D. The Doctrine of the Atonement
Sin finds its remedy under the fourth fundamental Christian doc-
trine, the atonement, worked by Jesus Christ. The orthodox under-
standing of the atonement sees Christ's death as satisfying the just
wrath of God over man's sins. Desiring to save mankind from the full
consequences of their sin, but unwilling to alter or to violate the law
that condemned mankind to those consequences, 9 3 God suffered
those consequences in union with man.94 He did so by sending his
only son, who was both human and God, to be punished as a man. In
this way, God satisfied justice while working mercy. 95 God himself ad-
hered to the law. He did not alter it, or find some pragmatic remedy
apart from it. Instead, Jesus Christ, the son of God, was sent to earth to
live a perfect life under the law, and according to the Bible, Christ did
so. He also was sent to die. God the Son, who is one with God the
Father from eternity, would cry from the cross to his father, "My God,
my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" 9 6 When Christ died, the Trinity
itself split, in order to fulfill the law while providing forgiveness to
humans. The doctrine that God himself keeps the law-his own law-
even at so a great a cost to himself, demonstrates his most profound
commitment to the rule of law. Man cannot hope to achieve higher.
Neither the magnitude of God's available authority, nor the magni-
tude of the result, nor the magnitude of the cost, justified the depar-
ture from the law. How much less, then, should man, bearing God's
image, depart from the law?97 Henry Bracton, thirteenth century fa-
ther of the common law,98 explained:
93. See Exodus 34:7; Matthew 5:17-20.
94. See Isaiah 53; Galatians 2:20.
95. See Romans 1:16-17:
For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto
salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For
therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written,
The just shall live by faith[;]
see also Romans 3:26 ("To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just,
and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.").
96. Matthew 28:46c; Mark 15:34c (quoting Psalm 22).
97. F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 101 (1920):
Law had been conceived as existing independently of the will of any ruler, inde-
pendently even of the will of God; God himself was obedient to law; the most
glorious feat of his Omnipotence was to obey law:-so the king, he is below the
law, though he is below no man; no man can punish him if he breaks the law, but
he must expect God's vengeance.
98. SeeJOHN C.H. Wu, FOUNTAIN OFJUSTICE 71-77 (1955) (describing the importance
of Bracton, and his title to being acclaimed father of the common law).
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The king must not be under man but under God and under the
law, because law makes the king, Let him therefore bestow upon
the law what the law bestows upon him, namely, rule and power.
[F] or there is no rex where will rules rather than lex. Since he is the
vicar of God, And that he ought to be under the law appears clearly
in the analogy ofJesus Christ, whose vicegerent on earth he is, for
though many ways were open to Him for his ineffable redemption
of the human race, the true mercy of God chose this most powerful
way to destroy the devil's work, he would use. not the power of
force but the reason ofjustice. Thus he willed himself to be under
the law that he might redeem those who live under it. For He did
not wish to use force but judgment.9 9
The rule of law can receive no higher endorsement, in fact no greater
sanctity, then it does from this distinctive doctrine of the Christian
faith. Whatever diverse sources give rise to the rule of law, whatever
prudence and welfare enhancements support it, the rule of law
scarcely could find more committed supporters than those who, like
Bracton, view human government and law from a thoroughgoing and
orthodox Christian worldview.
Here a corollary accompanying such a profound commitment to
the rule of law should be noted. That is, if God himself adheres to the
rule of law, so should civil government. This should be true, even to
the extent that this adherence puts some matters beyond the authority
of civil government. If parenting, or cultivation of the arts, or the pro-
vision of medical care, cannot be done properly within the rule of law,
they ought not to be done by civil government, at least if its commis-
sion is to execute justice. The rule of law, then, is not only a precept
for means, but also a precept for ends.
M. A Post-Christian Notion of the Rule of Law
The rule of law flourished in the common law under the influ-
ence of the Christian faith. Beyond the four fundamental doctrines of
the faith discussed here, many Christian principles support the rule of
law. 100 One might well wonder, then, how abandoning the Christian
faith might affect the rule of law today. If America has become in-
99. 2 BRACTON, supra note 1, at 33 (footnotes and original brackets omitted).
"Bracton's book is the crown and flower of English medieval jurisprudence." 1 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 206 (photo. reprint
1968) (1895). The beginning of this passage is famous also for being the words Chief
Justice Edward Coke quoted to James I during their argument on Sunday, November 13,
1608. The king became enraged, and nearly struck Coke with his fist. See CATHERINE
DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 303-06 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Genesis 1:28 (recording that man is to exercise dominion over the earth);
Matthew 5:17-18:
(Vol. 38
creasingly secularized, 10 1 what principled limits exist to curb civil au-
thority; what pre-existent, known precepts supply rules for new cases;
what gives rise to the equality of all before the law; what warns men
from pretending to the prerogatives of the perfect? What, indeed, re-
places the atonement as the profound sign and call to the rule of law?
In fact, recent jurisprudence has followed the trajectory one
might expect from a departure from the Christian worldview. Perhaps
the most noteworthy example is the joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.10 2 In Roe v. Wade,10 3 the United States Supreme
Court struck down state prohibitions on abortion. Rather than settling
the legal issue of abortion, however, Roe became the focus of continu-
ing controversy:
Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to
destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot
or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled[;]
see also Timothy 2:2 (exhorting prayer for kings "that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life
in all godliness and honesty").
101. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERiCAN LAw AND
POLITIcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 6-7 (1993):
[O]ne sees a trend in our political and legal cultures toward treating religious
beliefs as arbitrary and unimportant, a trend supported by rhetoric that implies
that there is something wrong with religious devotion. More and more, our cul-
ture seems to take the position that believing deeply in the tenets of one's faith
represents a kind of mystical irrationality, something that thoughtful, public-spir-
ited American citizens would do better to avoid[;]
see also Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 345, 351
(1979):
The radical separation of law and religion in twentieth century American
thought-I am speaking now not of constitutional law but of jurisprudence, of
legal philosophy-creates a serious danger that law will not be respected.... In
the last analysis, what deters crime is the tradition of being law-abiding, and this
in turn depends upon a deeply or passionately held conviction that law is not only
an instrument of secular policy but also part of the ultimate purpose and mean-
ing of life.
102. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming a constitutionally protected right to abortion,
though the justices in the majority failed to agree on its contour).
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe held that a constitutional right of privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," id.
at 153, and that a state therefore cannot proscribe abortion except when its interest "in the
potentiality of human life" becomes considerable in the "stage subsequent to viability," id.
at 164-65. Even at this stage, however, the state may not proscribe abortion "where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id at 165. Roe explicitly referred here to its companion case of Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), wherein the Court listed "factors [that] may relate to health" and
affect "medical judgment" to include "physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age." Id. at 192. Roe with Doe, therefore, restricted nearly to nonexistent any state
authority to proscribe abortion.
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[A] bortion was not just another question on which the Supreme
Court had made a constitutional ruling. Many members of the pub-
lic considered it the most momentous and pivotal social issue divid-
ing American society, involving the basic question of when life
began, what right women had over their own bodies and their own
fate, and what power other members of the family had over that
choice. Those who considered abortion the taking of human life
would not stand by and let matters rest. They would come back
again and again to attack Roe v. Wade either directly or indirectly-
by putting pressure on state legislatures to pass laws that would im-
pose financial and medical obstacles on abortions. Women who
considered the right to an abortion part of their basic human
destiny would not yield in their insistence that the right be pre-
served in all respects and that no financial or medical barrier be
placed in the way of that choice. 10 4
The Court itself repeatedly revisited the abortion issue as its composi-
tion appeared to shift gradually toward those reluctant to strike down
state limitations on abortion.10 5 By the time Casey arose, "the outlook
for continued recognition of the abortion right was doubtful."1 0 6
When the Court in Casey announced its reaffirmation of Roe, the "deci-
sion was almost totally unexpected." 10 7
For purposes of this essay, the most significant aspect of the
Court's opinion in Casey is its reformulation of the doctrine of stare
decisis:1 08
104. LEON FRIEDMAN, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS ABORTION 5-6
(Leon Friedman ed., 1993).
105. See id. at 6-11.
106. Id. at 11-12.
107. Id. at 14. Even ChiefJustice William Rehnquist did not expect the decision, having
circulated a majority opinion against Roe. The recently released papers of Associate Justice
Harry Blackmun explain that Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy had switched his vote to
give abortion the five-to-four support of the Court. See Charles Lane, How Justices Handle a
Political Hot Potato, WASH. PosT, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al.
108. Four years before Casey, Professor Henry Paul Monaghan adumbrated the Court's
approach to stare decisis:
There is ... a ... perhaps more universal justification for the application of stare
decisis to contested matters, one that also arises from a rationale concerned with
stability and continuity. Namely, the Court must strive to demonstrate-at least to
elites-the continuing legitimacy of judicial review. A general judicial adherence
to constitutional precedent supports a consensus about the rule oflaw, specifi-
cally the belief that all organs of government, including the Court, are bound by
the law. At first blush it may seem perverse to defend the idea that the Court
maintains its subservience to the fundamental law by upholding decisions that
depart from that law. But this difficulty is not insurmountable. What the Constitu-
tion requires is often a matter for debate, and once having been adequately can-
vassed and resolved by the Court, an issue might presumptively remain at rest.
Even when the prior judicial resolution seems plainly wrong to a majority of the
present Court, adherence to precedent can contribute to the important notion
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The Court's duty in the present cases is clear. In 1973, it con-
fronted the already-divisive issue of governmental power to limit
personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new
resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing
on that issue, its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pres-
sure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown
only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address error, if error
there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to
the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule
of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's
original decision, and we do-so today.10 9
Stare decisis in Casey is not a method for seeking truth with humility,
sensitive to the reliance placed by others upon earlier judicial deci-
sions. 110 The Casey Court dismisses from its consideration the enor-
that the law is impersonal in character, that the Court believes itself to be follow-
ing a "law which binds [it] as well as the litigants."
To my mind, this rule of law argument does not suffer from criticism that the
man in the street is unaware of the overruling of "small" precedents and that, in
any event, he would expect the Constitution and not the Court's precedents to
control adjudication. For me, the real focus of rule of law theories about the
Supreme Court in the main is elites, at least "the reasoning classes." The concern
is to contain, if not minimize, the existing cynicism that constitutional law is noth-
ing more than politics carried on in a different forum .... My submission is that
the Court's institutional position would be weakened were it generally perceived
that the Court itself views its own decisions as little more than "a restricted rail-
road ticket, good for this day and train only." If courts are viewed as unbound by
precedent, and the law as no more than what the last Court said, considerable
efforts would be expended to get control of such an institution-with judicial
independence and public confidence greatly weakened.
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723,
752-53 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
109. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868-69 (1992).
110. To be sure, constitutional law is not-or at least should not be-common law. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... and...
Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ."). And commentators of diverse
stripe have explained that full-blown stare decisis may be out of place in constitutional law.
See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-13 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (marking the relative difficulty of legislative correction by amendment); RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDIcIARY 283-99 (1977) (locating the rule of law for constitu-
tional law in adherence to the text of the Constitution rather than to precedent); William
J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 427, 437 (1986):
In my judgment, however, the unique interpretive role of the Supreme Court
with respect to the Constitution demands some flexibility with respect to the call
of stare decisis. Because we Justices of the United States Supreme Court are the
last word on the meaning of the Constitution, our views must be subject to revi-
sion over time, or the Constitution falls captive to the anachronistic views of long-
gone generations[;]
see also William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736-37 (1949):
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mity of any error in Roe, "if error there was." 11 ' Instead, the use of
stare decisis in Casey was a prop to preserve the power of the Court.
The rule of law becomes the rule of the Court, for there is no
true law apart from the Court:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court
must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of a
Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law.
Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable
from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority
to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for
their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be un-
dermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see
itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with
legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the
Nation to which it is responsible. 12
The Court is the organ of the rule of law. Without a powerful Court,
there is no real law. How could it be otherwise when "[a] t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life[?] Beliefs about
The place of stare decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A judge
looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past history
and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the
Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his pred-
ecessors may have put on it. So he comes to formulate his own views, rejecting
some earlier ones as false and embracing others. He cannot do otherwise unless
he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives
do his thinking for him.
This reexamination of precedent in constitutional law is a personal matter
for each judge who comes along. When only one newjudge is appointed during a
short period, the unsettling effect in constitutional law may not be great. But
when a majority of a Court is suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be substan-
tial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken
their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that time-which may extend a
decade or more-constitutional law will be in flux. That is the necessary conse-
quence of our system and to my mind a healthy one. The alternative is to let the
Constitution freeze in the pattern which one generation gave it. But the Constitu-
tion was designed for the vicissitudes of time. It must never become a code which
carries the overtones of one period that may be hostile to another.
So far as constitutional law is concerned stare decisis must give way before the
dynamic component of history. Once it does, the cycle starts again. Today's new
and starting decision quickly becomes a coveted anchorage for new vested inter-
ests. The former proponents of change acquire an acute conservatism in their
new status quo. It will then take an oncoming group from a new generation to
catch the broader vision which may require an undoing of the work of our pre-
sent and their past.
These observations serve only to accentuate the difference between the stare decisis of
Casey and the stare decisis of the common law.
111. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
112. ML at 868.
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these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State." 1" 3 Attributes of per-
sonhood-the status that merits for humans their legal protection-
derive from one's own religious beliefs, not from some transcendent
order, some ultimate truth. It is the autonomous definition by each of
reality that gives humans dignity. But for our polity, it takes a Court to
bring law to such beings, a role Justice Scalia calls the product of a
"Nietzschean vision of. .. unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a
Volk who will be 'tested by following,' and whose very 'belief in them-
selves' is mystically bound up in their 'understanding' of a Court that
'speak[s] before all others for their constitutional ideals.'"1114 The rule
of law has become the rule of man-those who happen to sit on the
bench of the United States Supreme Court. l1 5
113. Id. at 851.
114. Id at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 197 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (1994) (foot-
notes omitted):
The edifice of precedent in doctrine cannot be built upon the shifting sands of
expectation, because to speak of expectation begs the question. I suspect that an
intuition of this sort may account for the false note detected in the lengthy and
somewhat extravagant protestations of fidelity to precedent in the controlling
joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, reaffirming while modifying Roe v.
Wade. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter were moved by the need for con-
tinuity and stability in constitutional law, yet paradoxically they seemed to give
this factor undue prominence relative to their conviction of the rightness of the
actual decision-almost as if the decision could not stand on its own and needed
an apology[;]
Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 581, 617 (2002):
The Court's new overruling rhetoric appears to conceptualize the Justices' role in
a new way. Instead of merely owing a duty to adhere to the Constitution's mean-
ing, as they best understand it-however that meaning may be arrived at-under
this new approach, Justices have to take the expectations of the American people
and the Court's own legitimacy into account. These expectations go beyond the
belief in the rule of law and the subsequent need for continuity and stability on
the law, although these are important considerations.
115. Justice Scalia noted later that the Casey treatment of stare decisis itself marked a
deterioration of the rule of law. When the Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), and struck down as unconstitutional a statute outlawing homosexual
sodomy, Justice Scalia dissented and demonstrated how differently the Court was treating
Bowers from how it had treated Roe in Casey. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2488-91
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For example, in Casey, "when stare decisis meant the preservation ofjudicially invented
abortion rights, the widespread criticism of Roe was strong reason to reaffirm it." Id. at 2488
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lawrence, "however, the widespread opposition to Bowers, a deci-
sion resolving an issue as 'intensely divisive' as the issue in Roe, is offered as a reason in
favor of overruling it." Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Casey revision of stare decisis was simply a device to cover the Court's exercise of
its will to preserve Roe. The Lawrence Court had no will to preserve Bowers, but rather willed
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Conclusion
One of the most chilling passages in the Bible-at least to a law pro-
fessor-is a judgment pronounced by the prophet Habakkuk on the
violation of the rule of law:
The burden which Habakkuk the prophet did see. 0 LORD, how
long shall I cry, and thou wilt not hear! even cry gut unto thee of
violence, and thou wilt not save! Why dost thou shew me iniquity,
and cause me to behold grievance? for spoiling and violence are
before me: and there are that raise up strife and contention. There-
fore the law is slacked, and judgment doth never go forth: for the
wicked doth compass about the righteous; therefore wrong judg-
ment proceedeth.
Behold ye among the heathen, and regard, and wonder marvel-
ously: for I will work a work in your days which ye will not believe,
though it be told you. For, lo, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter
and hasty nation, which shall march through the breadth of the
land, to possess the dwelling places that are not theirs. They are ter-
rible and dreadful: their judgment and their dignity shall proceed
of themselves.'16
A polity that despises the rule of law is condemning itself to the rule of
the lawless, those whose 'judgment and .. .dignity ...proceed of
themselves."1 17 For the rule of law is not only a principle built on relig-
ious foundations. It is also a touchstone of a people's commitment to
those religious foundations themselves. And those religious founda-
tions have resting upon them far more than just the rule of law.
to abandon it, and so its opinions did "not bother to distinguish-or indeed, even bother
to mention-the [Casey] paean to stare decisis coauthored by three Members of [the Law-
rence] majority." Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded his remarks on
this point: "To tell the truth, it does not surprise me, and should surprise no one, that the
Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set forth in Casey. It has
thereby exposed Casey's extraordinary deference to precedent for the result-oriented expe-
dient that it is." Id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Habakkuk 1:1-7 (Habakkuk cries in anguish to God for the wickedness he sees,
and especially for the wicked departure from the rule of law. The law itself has become a
tool of wickedness rather than a remedy for wickedness. God replies that he will send an
invasion of Chaldeans to avenge these wrongs. But instead of restoring the rule of law,
these invaders will subject God's people to their own lawless rule, a rule marked by'
whatever judgment the rulers choose to give. God's correction for evil is more evil still.
Observers of contemporary American law will find scant comfort in this passage, at least for
the short term.).
117. Id.
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